The News Team Blog

SC Magazine's try at predicting 2010

Dan Kaplan December 31, 2009

One of the great unintended consequences of my job, having covered the IT security space for nearly four years, is my great inability to accurately gauge the awareness that mainstream America has for cyber-risks.

Because I am so immersed in the topic, covering stories on a daily basis, writing about the vast array of vulnerabilities and breaches, legislation and lawsuits, phishing and spam, arrests and prosecutions, that I often forget infosec is not your typical cocktail party material.

But while I am certain that most of my friends and family aren't aware of even a small percentage of the digital threats out there today, I do believe that they are catching on to the problem, bit by bit.

The tipping point is still not here -- just last night, for example, I was borrowing a friend's laptop and noticed it didn't have active AV protection. She didn't seem too pressed to fix the problem.

Part of the blame for this apathy could be sheer risk/reward. Why accept security advice when the rational economic move is to ignore it, as a Microsoft researcher recently wrote about? Not to mention, attacks are more targeted these days (meaning nobody notices the threats out there), and banks are pretty good at reimbursing you if you do happen to fall victim to financial fraud.

Still, each year, cognizance grows.

So, with that said, here is SC Magazine's token summation of 2010 threat predictions, compiled through the dozens of emails we received from the Nostradamus' of the IT security community.

  • Social networking threats: Experts seem to be in across-the-board agreement that cybercrooks are going to increasingly target these new media platforms to push their wares. Also, organizations will have to worry that their end-users will leak sensitive information. I mean, this makes sense. And it's been happening already. After all, where else can you find 350 million people chilling out on a website?
  • New platforms: No surprises here. Take your pick. Mobile devices, though, seem the likeliest candidate -- yet some experts seem unconvinced. Still, one has to believe that once people are actively using these smartphones to make transactions, the bad guys will be riding right along.
  • Apple: I'll believe that the Mac OS has become a viable target when the PR folks in Cupertino start returning my phone calls. Next...
  • HTML5/IPV6: Updated web language and increased address space have some believing that these new technologies are going to be abused. But adoption may not come in 2010. I'm sure this will be on the list next year, as well.

Other mentions: Continued targeted attacks via socially engineered malware, such as banking trojan Zeus (Zbot); search engine poisoning, cloud computing risks and botnet infrastructure innovations.

The news, though, is not all doom-and-gloom. One interesting prediction from McAfee suggests that the threat of rogue anti-virus will actually drop now that "the fake anti-virus market has...been saturated and the profits for cybercriminals have fallen."

With all this said, I wish you all a Happy New Year, and look forward to talking about cybercrime over a cocktail with you in 2010. Or 2011.


 

Citigroup: ACH or a different kind of federal bailout?

Dan Kaplan December 22, 2009

I find it hard to believe that Citigroup's media relations department would so adamantly deny the occurrence of a breach if it wasn't being completely genuine.

Because that is what they have done today in light of a report in The Wall Street Journal that the partially government-owned financial services firm was the victim of a hack that stole tens of millions of dollars.

When I read this story, there wasn't much meat, and I was pretty skeptical. I got even more skeptical when the FBI wouldn't comment on the story at all — not even to say that it was investigating.

So I did some searching around the blogosphere and saw that many others were equally suspicious of the story.

And then I remembered a story we wrote not too long ago, when the FBI said it was actively investigating a huge number of Automated Clearing House (ACH) fraud cases in which cybercriminals got a hold of mostly small- and mid-size corporate bank accounts to transfer large sums of money out. Attempted losses, the FBI said, have reached more than a $100 million.

This type of fraud, made possible by the data-stealing Zeus, or Zbot trojan, is arguably the biggest information security news story of the year.

So here's the FBI saying Citi, one of the world's biggest banks, has lost tens of millions of dollars due to a breach.

Well, I wouldn't call ACH a breach — it's more of an issue of a customer getting hacked than any bank — but I could see how something like this could get lost in translation.

So there you have it. This is nothing new.

Call it a scoop that wasn't.

Problem solved.

Then again, maybe this was, in fact, a well-orchestrated Russian Business Network hack, and nobody is talking because the presidential administration wants to protect one of the financial services industry's most prized assets from any additional pounding.

Can you say data breach bailout?

Happy Holidays everyone.

 

Time for SMBs to step up to the plate

Dan Kaplan November 24, 2009

Time and time again, we've seen information security regulations and guidelines delayed due to the burden they might impose on small businesses.

For example, state officials, on multiple occasions, have pushed back enforcement of the Massachusetts data security regulations due to small business complaints, and most recently, the Federal Trade Commission announced it would postpone enforcement of the the Red Flags Rules until next summer.

The economy is partially to blame, and it is a decent justification. After all, many small- and mid-size businesses are having enough trouble simply surviving the worst recession in a half-decade, never mind needing to concern themselves with additional costs.

But then comes astounding alerts from the FBI that hackers have this year seriously turned their attention to smaller organizations as part of their slick, moneymaking operations. Bigger businesses may have the resources to better deal with the problem, and cybercrooks know this. So they now seem to be focusing more on the weakest link. And why not? Raiding the bank accounts of 10 mom-and-pop shops is likely just as valuable as compromising one big business. And probably much easier.

In today's threat landscape, it is incomprehensible for any size organization to consider implementing tougher security controls an unnecessary burden.

I've had discussions with experts about this. And they've told me that securing an organization does not require a great deal of investment. In fact, the basics -- updated anti-virus, patched machines, a comprehensive security policy, employee training, some web and email filtering -- should be enough to keep the bad guys out. The sad part is, many firms simply aren't doing the most fundamental stuff.

There is another side to this coin. Regulators must stiffen their enforcement agendas. Enough submitting to the concerns of business owners. It's 2009. There is no more slack that can be given. The losses are simply too large to bear any longer.

Thanksgiving is a holiday during which to cherish what we have. But the organized cybercriminal groups that always seem to be one step ahead of everyone else want to take all of that away, one phishing email or compromised PC at a time.

It's time the smaller firms fight back.

 

Governator does consumers a disservice with SB-20 veto

Dan Kaplan October 23, 2009

Joe Simitian, a Democratic state senator from California, is still scratching his head, some two weeks after Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed SB-20, an update to the landmark 2003 Golden State breach notification bill, known as SB-1386.

They say that imitation is the highest form of flattery. Well, some 45 states have more or less copied California's pioneering move. And there was no reason to believe that a similar scenario wouldn't have played out again had the Governator signed SB-20 into law.

But, alas, it was not to be. The new legislation would have required that breach notification letters going to California residents also contain specifics around the data-loss incident, including the type of personal information exposed, a description of the incident, and advice on steps to take to protect oneself from identity theft. The law also would have mandated that organizations that suffer a breach affecting 500 or more people must submit a copy of the alert letter to the state attorney general's office

"“It was one of the most surprising vetoes I've gotten in nine years in the legislature,” Simitian told ApparelNews.net. “There were no amendments from the business community. There was no cost to the state.”

But Schwarzenegger, known for his large army of business allies, argued that the additional information that corporations would have been required to provide would have proved an additional burden to them, while not really helping consumers.

Simitian isn't the only one reacting with displeasure. From the Consumer Federation of California:

Governor Schwarzenegger's final verdict on a host of critical consumer protection bills this past weekend left consumer advocates disappointed. Of the 14 bills identified by the Consumer Federation of California (CFC) as most important, in only six instances did thegovernor take the side of the consumer.

While acknowledging that the governor signed several consumer protection laws, Richard Holober, executive director of the Consumer Federation of California stated: “We are disappointed that the governor sided with big business interests and against consumers on the majority of bills that reached his desk. The governor turned a deaf ear to California consumers on key food safety, automobile insurance and financial privacy proposals."

I also must respectfully disagree with the governor. How does he know the additional details won't help consumers. With data breaches becoming such a regularity, I would think consumers are now demanding more details, if for no other reason so they can discern between incidents.

And I'm not so sure that I can empathize with businesses. While the law may require organizations to do some additional work, I would argue that it is work that should be done anyway. After all, businesses must learn from their mistakes. Isn't the best way to do that by understanding the entire scope of an incident.

Simitian, is pledging that, pardon the metaphor, he'll be back with this bill in next year's session.

And at least not all of Schwarzenegger's legislative decisions are bad ones.

 

Changes needed in the world of online banking

Dan Kaplan September 29, 2009

The security of online banking is being tested like it's never been tested before. A number of recent incidents have made the news in which mostly small businesses have lost tens of thousands of dollars to overseas cybercrooks.

Hats off to The Washington Post's Brian Krebs for breaking most of these stories and getting the victims on the phone to discuss exactly what happened.

As Krebs describes, many of the scenarios are being played out in a similar fashion. A targeted, socially-engineered email arrives at a business or other organization, such as a school district. A gullible employee opens it and installs a pernicious, difficult-to-detect trojan, such as Zeus or Clampi, which sits quietly on the infected desktop until that employee visits the company's online bank site. At this point, the malware lifts username and password, sends it back to the attacker, who quickly wires money out of the victim's account to a "money mule" -- and the rest is pretty much history.

What makes these attacks interesting is that apparently such technologies as tokens are not helping much. The attackers have created a slick scheme so that when the user visits the bank site, he or she is greeted with a fake login screen. Not sensing the page is a fake, the victim will give up his or her username and password (and one-time token or other second-factor, if applicable). The crooks will capture these details in real time and enter them into the real bank page, allowing them to transfer cash before the victim can even bat an eyelid.

It sounds as if it is time for end-users and banks to shift some their existing habits.

They may want to consider out-of-band authentication -- meaning get that second factor off the computer that the hijacker already has compromised. Technologies such as those offered by Phone Factor, which offers a phone-based tokenless authentication system, may answer the call for additional security, no pun intended.

Banks, meanwhile, should look into additional fraud detection capabilities. I recently got briefed by ArcSight, which has launched a new security information and event management solution specifically for financial institutions.

And, it might be wise to revisit such ideas as single-site browsers, in which the user can only login to his or her bank through a web browser that sits as an application on the desktop. You can navigate all you want to one particular site -- say Bank of America -- but you won't be able to get anywhere else.

Clearly, better front- and back-end controls are needed.

But as Krebs writes, perhaps banks don't need to care.

Businesses and consumers do not enjoy the same legal protections when banking online as consumers. Consumers typically have up to 60 days from the receipt of a monthly statement to dispute any unauthorized charges.

In contrast, companies that bank online are regulated under the Universal Commercial Code, which holds that commercial banking customers have roughly two business days to spot and dispute unauthorized activity if they want to hold out any hope of recovering unauthorized transfers from their accounts.


Banks may just assume the risk that the consumer is not going to immediately spot the fraudulent transaction, thus buying them time and saving them the cost of recouping losses.

Of course, it all goes back to end-user awareness. Trojans don't magically appear on victim machines. Organizations need to do a better job of patching for client-side vulnerabilities -- they're nowhere close, right now -- and in training employees to not open (or act on) emails that look suspicious.

More to come, surely, with this story.
 

What's old is new again

Dan Kaplan August 13, 2009

As we gear up for the 20th anniversary edition of SC Magazine, set to drop in November, I've been forced to get pretty nostalgic about the security industry.

Considering I joined the staff here in January 2006 -- and the extent of my IT security knowledge prior to that was the Melissa worm -- I don't have a lot of memories from which to draw.

In fact, I still can't believe that SC is turning 20. I would have loved to see that inaugural 1989 edition. Hopefully, we still have it laying around somewhere, but considering the publication took shape in the UK, under different ownership, I'm not so sure that gem will ever be found.

But as our staff brainstorms ideas for this momentous occasion, we, of course, plan to look at how the threat landscape has changed. Clearly, quite a bit. Compliance demands, the rise of the CSO, botnets, targeted malware.

I don't need to rehash how professional and sophisticated the cybercriminal underground has gotten compared to as soon as just a few years ago.

Yet, there's also so much that remains the same. And I think it's important to show that.

Spam immediately comes to mind. But so does the biggest security story of the last couple of weeks: the Twitter distributed denial-of-service attacks. DDoS attacks have been happening for years -- an assault on the Department of Justice website in 1996 was how former OMB director Karen Evans got her first taste of cybercrime.

It was funny seeing some of the more mainstream outlets last week write the obligatory sidebar about what a DDoS is. They could've just as easily pulled from the archives. Not much was different about this attack -- other than the target. (If anything, let this be a wake-up call to some of these social networking sites that security must be a priority).

So, in the end, not much has changed within this space. Maybe that's why security pros can get pretty frustrated with their jobs -- they're always fighting the same fires. And now with more check boxes to fill out than ever before.
 

From the jury room

Greg Masters August 05, 2009

I am just back from two weeks on jury duty. The hours were good, lunch in Chinatown was a treat, and I was heartened by the legal process. However, as someone in the security field, one element of the experience stood out for me.

While the security guards screening everyone entering the municipal building were friendlier than those at airports, the procedure was the same. We had to pass our bags through an X-ray machine while we passed through a metal detector. So, they've got the physical security part covered.

However, once inside the building, security concerns seem to have been abandoned. Virtual security, that is.

A few times the court officer who shuffled us around requested that cell phones be turned off when we entered the court room. Makes sense. But, while that prevented interruptions from incoming calls, it didn't stop my fellow citizens from taking the devices out to make use of their 3G and Wi-Fi connections and web and text communication options.

I was surprised to witness the use of laptops and smart phones, even during the voir dire process. My fellow jurors were permitted to text away even as lawyers were questioning the jury pool. The iPhones and BlackBerries came out even from the jury box during breaks in the trial presentations.

I'm not saying my fellow jurors were revealing details of the proceedings. Likely, they were scanning headlines and checking in with the office and with loved ones. But talk about the insider threat.

Was the integrity of the judicial process breached? Who knows. Perhaps I'm being overly cautious. But, obviously there's some call for a ruling here. On a higher profile case, I can imagine tweets being fed to media outlets, or details being shared for whatever reason.

Ban cell phones and laptops from the courtroom? Let's start, at least, by monitoring their use.
 

The payment industry must reinvent itself

Dan Kaplan July 16, 2009

Ever since the economy went down the toilet, and President Obama took office, I've been doing a lot of thinking about infrastructure -- and how our country stinks at it compared to other parts of the world, namely Europe.

Our roads and bridges are cracking at the seams, our trains go too slow, our lights don't always stay on....I could go on and on in addressing the deficiencies.

Perhaps the reason for this is that we've poured too much money into the Iraq war -- what did that exactly solve, again?

Or maybe it's because Wall Street lured our best and brightest with promises of big paychecks, even heftier bonuses and an extravagant lifestyle. Instead of coming up with a cure for cancer or designing a superior air traffic control system, these grads took trading jobs with Goldman and Merrill and Bank of America.

That's at least what Tom Friedman suggested in this New York Times Op-Ed piece from late last year. In it, he argues that America needs a "makeover," and fast, if it is to thrive in the 21st century:
To top it off, we’ve fallen into a trend of diverting and rewarding the best of our collective I.Q. to people doing financial engineering rather than real engineering. These rocket scientists and engineers were designing complex financial instruments to make money out of money — rather than designing cars, phones, computers, teaching tools, Internet programs and medical equipment that could improve the lives and productivity of millions.

Which brings me to security. Specifically, payment security, and why we need an infrastructure overhaul.

The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) does a baseline job of requiring that merchants get better at securing cardholder data. But, breaches, monster breaches, actually, still are happening on a regular basis and many people are having their data fraudulently used by cybercrooks.

In the end, as Gartner analyst Avivah Litan told me today in a conversation, merchants aren't -- and will never be -- in the business of security. That's why to truly push back the sophisticated cybercriminal element, the payment system must be "fundamentally upgraded," Litan said.

I agree. Technologies such as Chip and PIN, tokenization and end-to-end encryption are ways to take much of the burden out of the hands of merchants -- who, let's agree, aren't exactly the best data gatekeepers. Fraud would go down.

Chip and PIN, specifically, involves cards being embedded with a customized chip that would be authenticated when a customer entered their PIN. In the UK, it has resulted in a dramatic decline in fraud rates for card-present transactions.

Bob Carr, CEO of Heartland Payment Systems, which suffered the worst reported data breach of all time, is trying to do that something similar. He said PCI is too human-intensive, so why not incorporate a technology across the payment chain that would work to mask the data at its source. His idea is end-to-end encryption.

Of course, there's cost. But merchants have to now accept the fact that security is part of their business objective. It's not going away.

(And just think, maybe a whiz kid who would've, before the economy tanked, opted for a hedge fund job will be the one who designs a way to affordably overhaul the payment infrastructure).

*You won't want to miss our September cover story, where we'll look at exactly what happened at Heartland, whether the PCI certification process needs a revamping and what companies need to do beyond PCI.
 

Time to look inward instead of threatening legal action

Dan Kaplan July 02, 2009

News this week that Juniper Networks had pulled Barnaby Jack's planned Black Hat presentation and demo on ATM software vulnerabilities was met with dismay by the security community.

Is anyone else tired of this already? It seems not a year passes when a researcher isn't threatened with a lawsuit for plans to expose flaws in a particular technology. (This one probably struck most people harder than others because Jack actually planned to wheel an ATM on stage and make it spew out twenties).

I know that if the craps table had been mean to me the night before -- everyone else always seems to have the luck -- I would've been running for the cash and worried about getting quotes later.

All kidding aside, I just wish this "responsible disclosure" debate was just sorted out already by the courts so we wouldn't have these same issues year after year. Wouldn't it be easier if, say, there was a Nevada law that required researchers to supply affected vendors with X number of days notice prior to presenting flaw findings. And if they didn't have the problem fixed by then, then it's game on?

Because, as it stands now, it sounds as if companies such as Juniper, where Jack works, immediately cave to any semblance of resistance from the affected technology manufacturer.

ISS, IOActive, they've all done it in recent years.

Researcher Alexander Sotirov suggests that this epidemic of nixed presentations likely can be blamed on overly sensitive researcher's employers. He tweeted on Tuesday:
Barnaby should quit Juniper and join me in being an independent consultant. The corporate environment stifles interesting security research.

For me, I think the right answer is telling these software and hardware makers to build their product secure from the start, so smart researchers like Jack can't figure out a way to exploit them.

At the minimum, vendors should get their act together to issue a patch in time for the researcher to present his or her findings. That's the least they can do for someone who likely saved them a fortune before the bad guys figured out the security hole.
 

A change in mindset has arrived

Dan Kaplan June 10, 2009

News late last week that Jeff Moss was appointed as one of 16 fresh faces to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council didn't quite draw the same amount of attention as President Obama's cybersecurity speech did a few days earlier.

But it should have.

You see, Jeff Moss is a hacker.  He still is widely known by his online alias Dark Tangent.

A hacker being named to a government advisory role? It can't be.

Look how far we've come.

To put this in some perspective, the HSAC is chaired by a judge and a senator. Its member list is undeniably blue blooded, riddled with titles such as CEO, president, partner, governor, trustee, mayor.

Moss is a refreshing addition.

Granted, Moss is no longer on the side of the fence that could land him in jail. Actually, that's why he gave up the trade after high school. But as the founder of the Black Hat and DEFCON conferences -- arguably the biggest hacker events during the year -- he clearly still considers himself very much a part of the security research community, which quite often blurs the line between the lawful and the questionable.

With that said, Moss' representation on the council serves as an eye-opening moment for the federal government. I liken it to placing a former mobster on anti-racketeering board. Moss is very smart; he can offer perspective that few others can.

Our nation's leaders finally understand that to fight cybercrime requires the cooperation of everybody, even if that somebody formerly hacked phone systems so he could make free international calls.

Moss will be able to draw from his rich experience as a hacker and call on his many interactions with both the good guys and, I'm sure, the bad guys.

Of course, that's not to say that Moss can't also lend some perspective as a business leader. He did start Black Hat and DEFCON from scratch, successfully selling the former to CMP Media in 2005. Moss also has held roles at Ernst & Young and Secure Computing -- so he surely knows a thing or two about wearing a tie to the board room.

Apparently, the DHS isn't only looking to the private sector for advisory help. The Pentagon also is leveraging America's IT security gene pool to recruit "hacker soldiers," who will help the government prepare for the next generation of war. The kind that isn't fought on the deserts of Iraq or Afghanistan.

I see these developments as two great positives.

Experience ultimately can save our nation's cyberinfrastructure. No more political posturing.